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Events have developed quickly these last days and weeks in Mali, as fast as an all terrain vehicle
can drive in the sand, basically. And although electronic media can go faster than four wheel drives,
they can only go as fast as the rumours they feed on. Elsewhere, I have argued that in following
events in the Sahara, everything is shrouded in a haze of dust. Nothing is known with certainty, all
depends on rumour and a form of hearsay known as ‘the Tuareg telegraph’ that can only be
interpreted with deep inside knowledge of the Saharan world.[1] I shall be honest, I can no longer
rightly claim to have that deep inside knowledge, it is too long ago since I was last in the Azawad.[2]
But the same goes for the vast majority of journalists and Sahara watchers now active, which leads
me to plead here for extreme prudence in the analysis of the current situation in Northern Mali, a
prudence that is often ignored in favour of tempting speculations. Here I would like to address a few
of these pieces of speculative analysis with the single goal of asking for more prudence because
precipitous judgements can have grave consequences for the future denouement of the conflict.
Current ‘Knowledge’ and the Sources of Information
To begin with one obvious example: the recent statements in the press that the MNLA[3]  and its
allies ‘control’ the Azawad are large exaggerations. What we know is that the Malian Armed Forces
have retreated from The North and that various Tuareg movements are present in the main cities.
This however, does not mean that they control these cities or the bush surrounding them. As the
relations between the two main known groups – MNLA and Ansar ud-Din[4] – are not clear either,
we cannot even begin to speculate who controls which city and to what extent. The cities of Gao and
Timbuktu and the riverain villages will be especially difficult to control as they are largely inhabited
by Songhay populations who, for the most part, do not want to be part of an Azawadi State, and who
have organised and supported vigilante movements against the Tuareg in the past, as well as quite
recently. As for the Azawad hinterland, as far as I am concerned, effective control would mean
effective relations with and assistance to humanitarian organisations in order to prevent the
upcoming famine. This is not the case.
But there are more tricky possible misinterpretations of finer nuance. For our information we are
essentially depending on two sources. We have the official written communiqués of the MNLA,
published on their website, and the official communiqués of the CNRDRE[5], the Malian military
junta, filmed and transcribed by Malian and international media. The Malian, Azawadian, and
international press repeat the official communiqués, with only the Azawadian press adding further
inside information, albeit with a highly political colour. These all depend for further information on the
very scarce contact they can have with inhabitants of the Azawad, which forms the second source:
sparse eye witness accounts. The eye witness accounts journalists gather are complemented by the
contacts researchers and NGO workers have with inhabitants of the north, which are sometimes
shared with the press. These two sources are both unreliable or incomplete for different reasons.
To start with the latter, the untrustworthiness lies in the incompleteness of the statements and the
eye witnessing. First of all, telecommunication is only possible within the bigger cities and villages
in northern Mali, but some of the mobile phone antennae have been destroyed in the fights. So far
no one has tried to contact people who have freshly arrived in refugee camps and who could tell
more about the situation in the bush. If they would, they would probably tell of disaster, but it would
relate to drought and hunger, not to politics, about which they don’t care. In Mali, politics is a city
game. This goes for the north as well as the south. Down south, the rural citizens of Mali expect only
one thing of their government: to improve their economic situation, or at least to not worsen it.[6] In
the Azawad the rural population expects nothing good from the government at all and they only hope
for it to leave them alone. To most Tuareg pastoralists, ‘Azawad independence’ means ‘no more
state interference in our lives’. As for the cities at present: anyone who is not a fighter or a seasoned
war journalist (so far absent, but there are so many conflicts to cover) tries to stay alive by avoiding
going outside during the fighting and even just after the fight. People will stay indoors and go out
only for the most necessary short errands. Hence, all we receive are snatches of the fights in the
main cities, mostly of what people hear outside: shooting, shouting, or silence. Stronger still, when I
called a friend in Kidal to ask him about the situation when the MNLA and Ansar ud-Din attacked,
he answered that he did not know and received his news from RFI, French International Radio.
Thus, news brought feeds into news given in a particular loop. It eventually results in a clear picture
but this is a slow process where rumour and misinformation are not always weeded out carefully,
and where we risk questions asked quickly becoming answers given, producing facts without basis.
The official press releases from both sides should be mistrusted because they are mainly agit prop,
framed to justify actions or to generate a particular effect from outside. The junta and the Tuareg
rebels vie for outside support, be it in the form of actions taken in their support, or against the
adversary.
The Presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
The latter is of especial importance, and both play the same trump card. Both sides calculate that
the belief in the West, especially in the US, that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)[7] is
involved in the conflict, can lead to international intervention. Therefore, the MNLA denies the
presence of AQIM or even Ansar ud-Din in the field, or, for the latter, at least denies it has any
importance or support from their side. The Malian armed forces who until recently fought in The
North stressed the presence of both Ansar ud-Din and Al-Qaeda, and even the Nigerian Islamist
group Boko Haram in every combat in the hope of support from US or European troops present in
the country or close by. Both the absence or presence of Islamist fighters in any given battle or any
given place in time remain unverified and largely unverifiable too, although the knowledge that they
exist and are there is solid. Absence is always hard to prove and presence is hard to establish.
Ansar ud-Din does not communicate with the outside world and neither has AQIM very much
recently.[8] The few eyewitness accounts that do some seem to indicate their presence are not
conclusive either. The first is that fighters shouted Allahu Akbar in the street of Kidal, and that
bystanders repeated the slogan. Allahu Akbar has been the principal battle and victory cry in the
Muslim world over the past 1432 years. Hearing it is as meaningful as hearing yippiekayee
motherf*#ker! You know there’s Americans around, but you still don’t know if they will vote for some
religious zealot.
The second shard of evidence, communicated over twitter a few days ago, was that Hassaniyya
was spoken in the streets of Gao, an Arabic dialect spoken by the Bîdân or Moors living in the
western part of the Sahara. This too is completely circumstantial. The reasoning would be that as
many AQIM fighters are presumed to be Mauritanian (a common knowledge as unsubstantiated as
anything else by the way), hearing Hassaniyya would indicate the presence of Mauritanians and
hence of AQIM fighters. Northern Mali has a large indigenous community of Hassaniyya speakers,
some members of which might have joined the MNLA, as they had joined previous rebel
movements. They might even be simple inhabitants of Gao who have not fled the city in fear of the
battle and its possible side effects of vengeful anger by the largely Songhay population against its
Arab inhabitants, an effect well remembered from the recent past. The most reliable indications we
have that fighters of any kind with orthodox puritanical views on Islam are present come from Kidal,
where a barber has indicated that fighters demanded that he take posters of hairstyles showing
unveiled women off his walls. From Gao, rumours about the smashing of bars and bottles of alcohol
are coming in, but not from the disgruntled bar owners themselves. Again, gossip without a
verifiable source.
Nevertheless, the belief in the presence of AQIM as an ally of Ansar ud-Din remains widespread,
with the goals of one slowly becoming attributed to the other. Thus, RFI English stated that ‘Ancar
Dine wants the imposition of Sharia, or Islamic law, across Mali‘.[9] Again, there is absolutely no
proof of these goals being theirs. In fact, there is no proof of AQIM still being present in Northern
Mali either and some Jihadi Watcher Websites estimate the group to have retreated back to
Algeria.[10] Ansar ud-Din has released exactly one video in which it explains its goals in Tamasheq
and Fus’ha Arabic: to liberate the Azawad from the unjust rule of Mali and to rule it as an Islamic
republic according to Sharia Law.[11] These goals remain firmly nationalist and outside the domain
of global jihad which AQIM is supposed to follow. If any comparisons need be made, Ansar ud-Din
is most similar to certain Chechen movements, who are also fighting for an independent national
state to be ruled according to Islam, but without any plans for a World Wide Caliphate.
Conclusion
I insist on being very prudent in our analysis and acceptance of what largely remains unverifiable
hearsay and rumour on the grounds that they can lead to drastic actions, thereby becoming self-
fulfilling prophecies. Examples abound in history (WMD’s in Iraq come to mind quickly), but they can
even be given in the very recent past of this conflict. In October 2011, the world of journalists,
analysts, and Sahara watchers was abuzz with the word ‘manpad’: a cool sounding military slang for
shoulder mounted heat seeking ground to air missiles. In that month, Human Rights Watch
Emergencies Director Peter Bouckaert discovered open and apparently looted arsenals of these
weapons in Sirte, Libya.[12] The link between these weapons missing and the Tuareg was quickly
made, too quickly. It was directly presumed that the Tuareg repatriating from Libya had the missiles,
and that they would be selling them to AQIM, therewith creating a danger for the aviation world. We
can now come to the tentative conclusion that this was not the case.
Now that the battles in the North are over – for the moment at least – we know that none of the
Malian military aircraft (MIG jets and MI24 helicopter gunships) has been taken down, or even been
fired at with manpads. If the Tuareg had these arms, they would surely have tried to use them, and if
AQIM is fighting alongside the Tuareg nationalists, and if they had indeed bought these weapons
from them, they might have tried to use them too. There was none of it. However, the suspicion that
the Tuareg had these weapons and brought them into Mali from Libya was enough for the Malian
government to try to remilitarize the North, probably at the insistence of the US Government, in
violation of the Algiers Agreement of June 2006 between the government and the Tuareg rebel
movements preceding the MNLA, thereby increasing the tense relations with the nationalist Tuareg,
and giving the MNLA a legitimate reason (in its own eyes at least) to attack.[13]
Rumour and misunderstandings fuel conflict. This is known already from the oldest chronicles of
mankind and its holy books. If we want conflicts in the Sahara and the larger Muslim world to stop,
we perhaps should take heed of the last Sura in the Quran. Say: I take refuge with the Lord of
Mankind, The King of Mankind, The God of Mankind, From the evil of the slinking whisperer,
Who whispers evil into the hearts of Mankind, From among Jinn and Mankind.[14]
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